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First-generation Internet thinkers maintained that Internet
communications could not be subjected to local regulation.' The argument
went as follows: Internet content providers can inexpensively send content
via the Internet into every territorial jurisdiction in the world. Territorial
governments cannot stop this content at the border and cannot assert
regulatory control over the content source located abroad. If governments
try to filter content at the border, information can easily be rerouted. And if
some governments happen to assert regulatory control over a content
provider or its assets, the provider can cheaply and easily relocate to a
permissive jurisdiction and continue sending content worldwide from there.
Events during the past five or so years have demonstrated that this
conception of the Internet is wrong, or at least incomplete.2 Contrary to
early predictions, governments have taken a variety of steps within their
borders to regulate Internet content flows. They have, for example,
regulated users, hardware and software, Internet service providers, and
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48 STAN. L. Rav. 1367 (1996).
2. For a comprehensive critique, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999).
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financial institutions within their territory. These purely territorial
regulations have raised the cost of transmitting and receiving Internet
content, and have affected the price and availability of content even when it
originates elsewhere.3
Many now complain that the Internet is threatened by a patchwork of
state, national, and international regulations, and scores of lawsuits have
sought to invalidate them. Lawyers in the United States have employed an
array of legal weapons in this effort, the most prominent being the
Constitution's First Amendment.4 A less prominent but potentially more
powerful weapon-at least with regard to state (as opposed to federal)
Internet regulations-is the dormant Commerce Clause.
The dormant Commerce Clause is a judge-made doctrine that prohibits
states from regulating in ways that unduly burden interstate commerce. To
see how the dormant Commerce Clause has been applied to the Internet,
consider the leading case of American Libraries Ass 'n v. Pataki.5 American
Libraries Ass'n enjoined enforcement of a New York statute that prohibited
the intentional use of the Internet "to initiate or engage" in certain
pornographic communications deemed to be "harmful to minors." 6 In
enjoining enforcement of the law, the American Libraries Ass'n court
reasoned as follows: Because it is difficult for content providers to control
access to their websites and communications, a content provider outside
New York might inadvertently send proscribed content into New York.
Fear of liability in New York thus might chill the activities of a content
provider operating legally in California, thereby affecting legitimate
commerce wholly outside New York. Moreover, because states regulate
pornographic communications differently, "a single actor might be subject
to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by
states that the actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were
being accessed." 7 These extraordinary burdens on Internet communication
were said to outweigh any regulatory benefit in New York. In sum, "the
Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be marked off as a
national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation that, taken to
its most extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet altogether." 8
As this last sentence suggests, the reasoning of American Libraries
Ass'n extends far beyond the regulation at issue in that case. In fact, the
3. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1221-24 (1998).
4. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (invalidating two provisions of the federal
Communications Decency Act on First Amendment grounds); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162
(3d Cir. 2000) (invalidating the federal Child Online Protection Act on First Amendment
grounds).
5. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
6. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.20(6), .21(3) (McKinney, WESTLAW through 2000 legislation).
7. Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 168-69.
8. Id. at 169.
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dormant Commerce Clause argument, if accepted, threatens to invalidate
nearly every state regulation of Internet communications. For under the
logic of American Libraries Ass'n, nearly every state regulation of Internet
communications will have the extraterritorial consequences the court
bemoaned. This explains why the dormant Commerce Clause has been
called "a nuclear bomb of a legal theory" against state Internet
regulations.9 And indeed, many courts have followed the logic of American
Libraries Ass'n.l° The decided cases have mostly involved pornography
regulations and antispam statutes. But the logic of American Libraries
Ass'n and the cases that follow its reasoning extends to state antigambling
laws, computer crime laws, various consumer protection laws, libel laws,
licensing laws, and many more.
Many academic commentators support the emerging conventional
wisdom among courts that the dormant Commerce Clause requires
invalidation of state Internet communication regulations." In this Essay, we
take issue with this conventional wisdom, which is flawed in three respects:
It rests on an impoverished understanding of the architecture of the Internet,
it misreads dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and it misunderstands
the economics of state regulation of transborder transactions. We do not
argue that state regulation of Internet communications should be immune
from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Such a general conclusion would
be inappropriate because different state regulations raise different empirical
and technical issues that remain unresolved.'2 Our aim is simply to deflate
the emerging conventional wisdom, and to show that the dormant
Commerce Clause, properly understood, leaves states with much more
flexibility to regulate Internet transactions than is commonly thought.
The analysis proceeds as follows: Part I reviews dormant Commerce
Clause principles and describes how they have been applied to state Internet
regulations. Part I explains why economic efficiency is the appropriate
normative criterion under the dormant Commerce Clause and supplies the
economic analysis needed to understand how the Clause should apply to
9. Declan McCullagh, Brick by Brick, TIME DIGITAL DAILY, Jan. 31, 1997, at
http://www.time.comltime/digitaldaily/O,2822,11738,00.html. For similar sentiments, see, for
example, Spencer Kass, Regulation and the Internet, 26 S.U. L. REV. 93, 105 (1998), stating,
"[C]ourts will find many state statutes [that] purport to regulate the Internet to be unconstitutional
under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis."
10. See cases cited infra notes 45, 57-58, 161.
11. E.g., Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095, 1123-34 (1996);
Bruce P. Keller, The Game's the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal Law,
108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1593-96 (1999); David Post, Gambling on Internet Laws, AM. LAW., Sept.
1998, at 97; Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Virtual Reality and "Virtual Welters": A Note on the
Commerce Clause Implications of Regulating Cyberporn, 82 VA. L. REV. 535, 537-42 (1996).
12. Indeed, an important conclusion of our Essay is that one cannot assess the validity under
the dormant Commerce Clause of state Internet regulations taken as a whole; rather, the analysis
depends very much on the type of Internet service, the costs of geographical identification and
filtering associated with that service, the type of regulation, the nature of the penalties, and more.
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Internet regulations. This analysis also contributes to dormant Commerce
Clause theory generally by bringing theoretical clarity to the
"extraterritoriality" and "inconsistent regulations" prongs of dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. Part III then explains why dormant Commerce
Clause analyses of state Internet regulations to date have been flawed. The
focus in Part III is on the two types of state Internet regulation that
have been most frequently litigated: prohibitions on pornographic
communication with minors and antispam statutes. The final Part extends
the analysis to other state Internet regulations and comments on the
treatment of these issues under international law.
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE INTERNET:
EMERGING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
In this Part, we briefly review standard dormant Commerce Clause
principles, and then describe how those principles have been applied to
state regulations of the Internet.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate
commerce "among the several States."' 3 Even in the absence of affinmative
congressional regulation of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has
long invoked the "dormant" Commerce Clause as a basis for judicial
preemption of state law that unduly burdens interstate commerce. The
Court has devised a number of tests to serve this end.
The dormant Commerce Clause's central prohibition is on protectionist
state legislation that discriminates against out-of-staters. 4 If a state law
discriminates against out-of-staters, it is subject to "the strictest scrutiny of
any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives.""5 Discriminatory state regulations rarely
satisfy this standard. 6 A second dormant Commerce Clause test applies
when a state law is nondiscriminatory on its face but nonetheless impinges
on interstate commerce. In this context the Court applies a balancing test:
"Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987).
15. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
16. A rare exception is found in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), which upheld a ban
on the importation of bait fish.
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will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." '7
The heightened scrutiny test for discriminatory state legislation and the
balancing test for neutral state legislation that burdens interstate commerce
form the core of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The dormant
Commerce Clause, however, is also said to prohibit certain state laws that
regulate extraterritorially and others that lead to inconsistent regulatory
burdens. These aspects of the dormant Commerce Clause are unsettled and
poorly understood, but they play an important role in the Internet cases.
The Supreme Court sometimes invalidates state legislation on the
ground that it regulates extraterritorially. Consider Healy v. Beer Institute,"
which involved a challenge to a Connecticut law requiring beer companies
to post prices monthly and affirm that they were not higher than in three
contiguous states. The statute had the effect of limiting the ability of out-of-
state beer shippers to alter their prices outside of Connecticut during the
month in which they had affirmed prices in Connecticut. After noting that
the "critical inquiry" under the dormant Commerce Clause "is whether the
practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the
boundaries of the State,"' 9 the Court invalidated the statute. It reasoned that
the Connecticut law had the "extraterritorial effect... of preventing
brewers from undertaking competitive pricing in Massachusetts based on
prevailing market conditions.""0 On similar grounds, the Court has struck
down a liquor price affirmation scheme 2 and an Illinois antitakeover law
that governed communications between out-of-state acquiring corporations
and the out-of-state shareholders of acquirees 2"
The scope of the extraterritoriality principle is unclear.23 The Full Faith
and Credit and Due Process Clauses prohibit states from regulating out-of-
state conduct unless the conduct creates a "significant contact" or
"significant aggregation of contacts" with the state.2" Supreme Court dicta
suggest that the extraterritoriality prong of the dormant Commerce Clause
goes further and "precludes the application of a state statute to commerce
that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the
17. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
18. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
19. Id. at 336.
20. Id. at 338.
21. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
22. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
23. See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (11) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REv.
1865, 1884 (1987).
24. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
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commerce has effects within the State."' This formulation is clearly too
broad. Scores of state laws validly apply to and regulate extrastate
commercial conduct that produces harmful local effects.2" In Part 11, we try
to bring clarity to the dormant Commerce Clause's concern with
extraterritorial regulation.
The dormant Commerce Clause also prohibits state regulations that
"adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to
inconsistent regulations." 27 The meaning of the inconsistent-regulations test
is also unclear.2 1 It does not, for example, mandate state-law uniformity;
despite the dormant Commerce Clause, firms that operate in interstate
commerce often face different regulations in different states. To take two of
dozens of examples, the dormant Commerce Clause permits states to apply
local conceptions of tort law (say, strict liability) to multistate corporate
activity with a local contact, even if other states apply different tort regimes
(say, negligence), and it permits states to apply different blue-sky laws to
the same multistate securities offering.29 Part II offers an account of the
inconsistent-regulations concern that accommodates such nonuniformity.
B. The Internet Context
An emerging conventional wisdom among courts and scholars reads
these dormant Commerce Clause principles to require the invalidation of
much state Internet regulation. Two types of state Internet regulation
have received the most attention: statutes regulating pornographic
communication with minors and antispam statutes.
1. Pornographic Communication with Minors
Several courts have applied the dormant Commerce Clause to state
criminal laws concerning Internet transmissions of pornographic materials
to minors. The leading case is American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki.
3 °
American Libraries Ass'n concerned the validity of a New York statute that
prohibited intentional use of the Internet "to initiate or engage" in
25. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (quoting MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43 (plurality opinion)) (emphasis
added).
26. Such cases form the bread and butter of the field of conflict of laws. See, e.g., Wood v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that Texas law applies for an
invasion of privacy caused by a publication in California); Rutherford v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 943 F. Supp. 789, 790-91 (W.D. Ky. 1996) (holding that Indiana product-design law governs
even though products were designed in other states), affd, 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1998).
27. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
28. See Daniel R. Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams
Act, the Commerce Clause, and Insider Trading, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 47, 88-90.
29. MITE, 457 U.S. at 641 (plurality opinion).
30. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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communications "harmful to minors" that depict "actual or simulated
nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse.""a  The statute
established defenses to prosecution for defendants who, among other
things, (1) make a reasonable effort to ascertain the minor's true age;
(2) make a reasonable effort to prevent minors from accessing proscribed
materials, including "any method which is feasible under available
technology"; (3) restrict minors' access by requiring use of a verified credit
card or adult personal identification number; or (4) label content in a way
that facilitates blocking or screening.32 Violations of the statute are
punishable by one to four years of incarceration.33
In enjoining enforcement of the New York statute, the court began with
several claims about the architecture of the Internet. These claims played a
crucial role in its dormant Commerce Clause analysis and have been
embraced by other courts. The court first noted that information transmitted
via the Internet can appear simultaneously in every state. As a result,
" [oince a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available to all other
Internet users worldwide." ' Second, "Internet users have no way to
determine the characteristics of their audience that are salient under the
New York Act-age and geographic location."3 The court acknowledged
that credit card verification, content filtering, and adult identification
technologies can facilitate some geographical and identity discrimination on
the Internet.3 6 But it maintained that the costs associated with these
technologies were "excessive" and that the technologies were imperfect in
any event.37 The court concluded that "no user could avoid liability under
the New York Act simply by directing his or her communications
elsewhere, given that there is no feasible way to preclude New Yorkers
from accessing a Web site, receiving a mail exploder message or a
newsgroup posting, or participating in a chat room." 
38
Based on these factual premises, the court gave three reasons why the
New York statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause. First, the statute
exposed to liability, and thus chilled, the activities of persons outside New
York who had no intention of communicating with persons in New York.
31. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.20(6), .21(3) (McKinney, WESTLAW through 2000
legislation). The Act defines a communication as "harmful to minors" if it (a) "appeals to the
prurient interest in sex of minors," (b)"[i]s patently offensive to prevailing standards"
concerning material suitable for minors, and (c)"lacks serious literary, artistic, political and
scientific value for minors." Id. § 235.20(6).
32. Id. § 235.21(3).
33. Id. § 70.00; see id. § 235.21.
34. Am. Libraries Ass 'n, 969 F. Supp. at 167 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844
(E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 166-67.
37. Id. at 180 (citing ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855-56).
38. Id. at 171.
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The statute thus imposed costs on wholly out-of-state conduct. For
example, the court noted that fear of liability in New York might lead an
out-of-state bookseller to remove a book from its website, thus precluding it
from selling the book in its home state and in third states where such sales
would be legal.39
Second, the court held that the statute's out-of-state burdens
outweighed its local benefits. The court acknowledged that protection of
children against exposure to pornography was a legitimate state objective. It
reasoned, however, that the statute's local benefits were "limited" by the
fact that it only applied to pictorial messages' and could not regulate
communications from outside the United States.4" The court also asserted
that the act's out-of-state harms were "extreme" because the act applied to
every transaction in the world, and its chilling effect would dramatically
exceed the cases actually prosecuted.42
Third, the court asserted that the statute was invalid because it
subjected out-of-state Internet users to inconsistent burdens. The court
noted that every state could enact legislation governing indecent Internet
communications to minors. Every out-of-state content provider would then
need to comply with the New York regulation and every other state's
related regulation. This in turn would mean that every out-of-state content
provider would be forced to comply with the most restrictive state's
regulation even if she did not intend to communicate with persons in the
regulating jurisdiction. The court concluded that such a "haphazard and
uncoordinated"43 patchwork of state Internet regulations violated the
dormant Commerce Clause.44
Several courts have followed the reasoning of American Libraries
Ass'n in invalidating statutes similar to the New York statute.45 Other courts
have distinguished American Libraries Ass'n when a state prohibition on
pornographic Internet communications with minors included an element of
"luring" or "seducing" the minor into illicit sexual relations.46 These
39. Id. at 173-77.
40. Id. at 179.
41. Id. at 178.
42. Id. at 177-81.
43. Id. at 183.
44. Id. at 181-84.
45. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (invalidating under the dormant
Commerce Clause a New Mexico statute criminalizing dissemination by computer of materials
harmful to minors); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2000) (enjoining
enforcement of a Virginia pornographic communication law at the preliminary injunction stage, in
part on dormant Commerce Clause grounds); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (invalidating under the dormant Commerce Clause a Michigan
statute criminalizing the use of computers to distribute sexually explicit materials to minors).
46. See Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 485-86 (Ct. App. 2000); People v.
Foley, 709 N.Y.S.2d 467 (2000). American Libraries Ass'n itself contemplated this distinction.
969 F. Supp. at 179.
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courts reason that the "luring" element eliminates any genuine commercial
value in the regulated activity.47 They also assert that there is no reason to
think state prosecutors will enforce the law against out-of-state seducers.48
2. Antispam Laws
Spam is unsolicited e-mail messages, usually sent to many recipients at
one time. At least eighteen states have enacted antispam legislation of some
sort.4 9 Here we discuss the statutes of California and Washington, which
have been subject to legal challenge.
California's antispam law applies to persons "conducting business" in
California." It requires the sender of unsolicited e-mails to include
pertinent terms in the subject line (such as "ADV" for "advertisement" or
"ADLT" for "adult material") and to provide an easy means for the
receiver to notify the sender to cease sending such e-mails.51 Each violation
of the California statute can result in a $1000 fine, six months
imprisonment, or both,52 as well as a civil action for injunctive relief.53 The
Washington statute, by contrast, applies to anyone who sends e-mail from a
computer located in Washington or to an e-mail address that the sender
knows or has reason to know is held by a Washington resident.' It prohibits
spam that disguises the true origin of the message, that contains false or
misleading information in the subject line, or that uses a third party's e-mail
address without permission.55 Washington residents who receive span in
violation of the Act may sue for civil damages in the amount of $500 per
violation or actual damages, whichever is greater.56
Defendants in California and Washington, invoking American Libraries
Ass'n, have argued that the antispam statutes regulate extraterritorially,
create inconsistent obligations, and impose burdens on interstate commerce
that outweigh their local benefits. State courts in these states have
subsequently invalidated their respective antispam laws under the dormant
Commerce Clause. The Washington court's analysis was the more
extensive than that of the California court.5 7 The Washington court started
47. Foley, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
48. Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472-73.
49. See Spam Laws: United States: State Laws, at http://www.sparnlaws.com/state/index.html
(last visited Jan. 20, 2001).
50. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4 (West 2000).
51. Id.
52. l § 17538(f).
53. Id. § 17538.45(f).
54. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.190.010-.020 (West 2000).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 19.190.040.
57. The California court simply issued a conclusory order asserting that the California law
"unconstitutionally subjects interstate use of the Internet to inconsistent regulations, therefore
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from the factual premises that the Internet "doesn't recognize geographical
boundaries" and that potential spammers could not determine the
geographical location of someone with an Internet e-mail address."8 The
court thought state regulation of spain might subject spammers to "fifty
different standards of conduct" and that these "inconsistent regulatory
schemes could paralyze development of the Internet altogether." 9 For these
reasons, the court concluded that the Washington statute was "unduly
restrictive and burdensome" of interstate commerce.6'
It. SOME SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
THE REGULATION OF CROSS-BORDER EXTERNALITIES
The activities that are the subject of Internet regulation and associated
dormant Commerce Clause litigation are valuable to some individuals.
Pornographic websites provide the opportunity for consumers who desire
such material to purchase it. Bulk e-mail advertising provides information
that is valuable to some consumers who respond by purchasing the
advertised goods and services.
But these activities also cause harms. One by-product of the
opportunity for adults to purchase pornographic material over the Internet is
that some minors might access the material, contrary to the wishes and
judgment of their parents. A by-product of bulk e-mail advertising is that
some individuals may be inundated with solicitations that they do not desire
and that are costly to distinguish from useful e-mail that they need to read.
Economists call these harms "nonpecuniary externalities," a term that may
seem more familiar when used in reference to harms such as pollution.6
The harm to minors associated with pornography on the Internet and the
harm to consumers from unwanted bulk e-mail are much like the harm to
the neighbors of a cement mill. All of these harms befall third parties who
violating the dormant Commerce Clause." Ferguson v. Friendfinder, Inc., No. 307309, at 2 (Cal.
Super. Ct. June 2, 2000) (order sustaining demurrer).
58. State v. Heckel, No. 98-2-25480-7, at 34, 36 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2000) (oral
transcript).
59. Id.
60. State v. Heckel, No. 98-2-25480-7, 2000 WL 979720, at *1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 10,
2000) (order granting summary judgment).
61. A nonpecuniary externality is conventionally defined as a harm or benefit from a
transaction that is not transmitted through the price system. A pecuniary externality, by contrast, is
reflected in prices. Pollution from an industry that harms people other than those in the industry
itself and its customers is the paradigm example of a nonpecuniary externality. The harm to an
unsuccessful bidder at an auction (the loss of an opportunity to consummate a purchase at a
favorable price) that results from being outbid is an example of a pecuniary externality. Only
nonpecuniary externalities are a source of "market failure" that may warrant corrective
intervention. DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE TEXT 517-26 (2d ed.
1990).
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are not involved in the transactions that support the activity that generates
the harm.
State regulations of pornographic communications and state antispam
laws can in principle redress these in-state third-party harms. The problem
is that these state regulations can impose costs outside the state. The
decisions striking down Internet regulations under the dormant Commerce
Clause suggest that such out-of-state costs render the regulations
illegitimate.
Yet many state regulations of transjunisdictional activities affect out-of-
state costs. Nuisance actions against polluters across the border will
assuredly affect their costs; so too will products liability actions against out-
of-state manufacturers, local obscenity restrictions on real-space
pornography providers, and state blue-sky registration requirements on
multijurisdictional issuers. The dormant Commerce Clause plainly does not
strike down all such local regulations simply because of their extraterritorial
effect. How can one tell when these costs are appropriate and when they are
not? What is it about the out-of-state costs of Internet regulations that
renders them suspect?
Before proceeding to these questions, we should say a word about the
use of economic efficiency to inform our analysis of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Courts and commentators offer two theoretical
justifications for the dormant Commerce Clause. The primary justification
is that the dormant Commerce Clause ensures free trade among the states
and thereby secures the associated economic benefits.62 This justification is
directly grounded in economic efficiency and thus supports the use of
efficiency as a normative gauge for policy.
A secondary justification for the dormant Commerce Clause is that it
protects out-of-state actors who are burdened by a state's regulation but
lack a voice in the political process that generates it." The difficulty with
the process justification, however, is that it sweeps too broadly.
Innumerable state laws affect outsiders, and no one thinks that all (or even
most) of these laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause. What is needed
is a way to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate out-of-state effects. Our
economic perspective does just this by distinguishing between state
regulations that enhance overall economic welfare despite their
62. See, e.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988); H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-39 (1949); Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade
and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47. VAND. L.
REv. 1401, 1406 (1994); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1110-25 (1986).
63. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945); S.C. State Highway Dep't
v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 205-06 (1980); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 439 (1982).
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extraterritorial effects and state regulations that lower overall economic
welfare. In this manner, we unify the efficiency and process justifications
for the dormant Commerce Clause in a way that is consistent with much of
the pertinent case law.' The economic perspective also allows us to bring
some theoretical coherence to the otherwise undertheorized notions of
extraterritoriality and inconsistency that play an important role in the
Internet cases.
A. Decentralized Regulation, Protectionism, and Discrimination
The costs and benefits of regulation often vary geographically. Citizens
of wealthier jurisdictions, for example, may be willing to pay more to
protect health, safety, the environment, and the like than citizens of poorer
jurisdictions. The tastes of citizens may also vary across jurisdictions in
ways that affect the costs and benefits of regulation. Prevailing attitudes
toward gambling and sexually oriented materials, for instance, may depend
on the religious and cultural backgrounds of the local citizenry. Finally,
geographic factors may directly affect the value of regulation; auto
emissions are much more likely to cause dangerous concentrations of
pollutants in the Los Angeles basin than on the open prairie. For such
reasons, the benefits that a local citizenry derives from a particular
regulation, and its willingness to bear the costs, will commonly differ
across jurisdictions. The optimal regulatory policy will differ across
jurisdictions as well.
It follows that regulatory uniformity is often undesirable. Of course,
central governments can enact regulatory policies that vary across their
territories (although they rarely do, at least in the United States). To
complete the case for letting lower levels of government pursue their own
regulatory policies, therefore, one must further believe that lower levels of
government are better able to ascertain and implement the best regulatory
policy for the local citizenry than the central government. This situation
plausibly arises much of the time. Local government officials will often be
drawn from the local population and will have closer connections to local
constituencies, resulting in better knowledge of local preferences about
regulatory issues. Local representatives to central governments will often
represent a small minority of the central governing bodies and have
insufficient influence on policy outcomes to ensure the proper degree of
regulatory heterogeneity.
64. Several prominent treatments of the dormant Commerce Clause have used economic
efficiency as the touchstone for harmonizing the economic and process rationales for the doctrine.
E.g., Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 567-68
(1983); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 130-
40.
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This is the essence of the case for decentralized regulation,65 and it
seems to us to have no less force in the Internet context than elsewhere.
There is no reason to suppose, for example, that the perceived harm to
minors from access to pornographic material will be the same everywhere
regardless of the cultural and religious background of the citizenry, or that
e-mail users everywhere will react to common forms of spam (for example,
sexually oriented advertisements) in the same manner.
But decentralized regulation is not without its problems. One problem
is that the political process in any jurisdiction may fail to pursue policies
that are in the best interests of its citizens as a whole. Individuals and other
entities with large stakes in a policy outcome will organize to influence it;
those with smaller stakes often will not bother. Policies that are on balance
undesirable may thus be enacted if the costs are diffused widely enough that
resistance is ineffective.66
A common example is trade protectionism. Economic theory holds that
when a jurisdiction undertakes to insulate its producers from competition
through restrictions on the importation of goods and services, overall
economic welfare declines as the losses to in-state consumers and out-of-
state producers exceed the gains to the protected in-state producers. 6,
Protectionist policies nevertheless may be politically attractive in many
cases because the beneficiaries are often well-organized groups of in-state
firms. As mentioned above, the central purpose of the dormant Commerce
Clause is to prevent such protectionism, and the primary judicial tool for
effectuating this purpose is a prohibition on state regulations that
discriminate against out-of-state actors.68 The bulk of the Supreme Court's
65. For a general theoretical treatment, see, for example, WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL
FEDERALISM 11-13, 54-63 (1972). For application in the American federal context, see, for
example, Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1484, 1504 (1987). For application in the international context, see, for example, Alan 0.
Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services
Markets, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 49 (1999).
66. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962) (discussing the role of interest groups in legislation in various voting systems); MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (discussing the formation and effectiveness
of pressure groups).
67. Such restrictions reduce competition and raise prices. A welfare loss occurs because
goods or services are purchased from higher-cost domestic suppliers rather than lower-cost
foreign suppliers, and because higher prices cause some consumers to exit the market even though
they could benefit from transacting at the lower price that protectionism forecloses. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 61, at 537-42; PETER H. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 123-26 (9th ed.
1991). Some caveats exist, but none are essential to what follows and they need not detain us.
68. Supra text accompanying notes 14-16, 62. To see why discrimination against outsiders
serves as a marker for protectionism, consider an environmental law that requires pollution-
control devices on foreign-manufactured automobiles but not on locally manufactured
automobiles. It is difficult to imagine a justification for such a nonneutral policy other than a
desire on the part of local regulators to confer a cost advantage on local manufacturers and thus to
protect them to a degree from the consequences of foreign competition (or, equivalently, a desire
to shift the costs of regulation to foreign firms). A welfare loss arises because discriminatory
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dormant Commerce Clause cases-especially in recent years-has indeed
concerned discriminatory state legislation that suggests underlying
protectionism.69
The protectionist concern, however, is not generally implicated by the
Internet pornography and spain cases. The porn and spam regulations apply
equally to in-state and out-of-state content providers, and there is no
independent reason to believe that they are a pretense for protectionism.
Instead, the Internet cases implicate a different efficiency problem with
decentralized regulation, a problem that has not been well-theorized in
either the dormant Commerce Clause cases or the literature. This is the
problem presented by state regulation of cross-border externalities.
B. Some Economics of Externalities and Corrective Measures
Suppose that an agricultural operation in one state draws water from a
stream that flows into another state. The first state may have little incentive
to regulate water consumption by its agricultural operation, even if the
result would be that little water is left for downstream users in the other
state and that the total value of the states' combined agricultural production
could be increased if the upstream user were to engage in efforts to
conserve water. The potential regulatory failure here arises because of a
nonpecuniary externality that affects citizens outside of the regulating state.
Because of collective action problems and other transaction cost issues,
market solutions to nonpecuniary externalities often will not emerge; the
individuals harmed by externalities are often unable to act collectively to
purchase relief.7" The result, absent appropriate government action, is an
economically excessive scale of the activity producing the external harm
and an excessive level of the harm itself.
Figure 1 illustrates this problem without reference to jurisdictional
borders. The horizontal axis represents the quantity produced of some good
or service. The vertical axis is dollars. The downward-sloping function D
represents the demand for the good or service by consumers at any given
price. The upward sloping-function S represents the supply of the good or
service from the (assumed competitive) industry at any price. That supply is
determined by (and equal to) the industry's marginal cost of production at
regulation can induce consumers to choose domestic products over imported products even when
the imported goods are superior in quality or less costly to produce, other things being equal. Any
regulatory benefits could be achieved more cheaply through nondiscriminatory regulations.
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence thus embodies a strong presumption against the validity
of discriminatory state legislation.
69. Donald Regan, Movement of Goods Under the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
European Community Treaty 9-12 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
70. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16-17 (1960).
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each level of output.71 Assume, however, that each unit of output imposes a
harm equal to t on individuals who are not party to the transaction between
the buyers and sellers. Then the "social marginal cost" of production in this
industry is S + t, which is also depicted in the figure.
FIGURE 1
PP .................................... ...  S
........................
Qo Q
We assume that the individuals suffering the harm of t per unit of
output are unable to organize themselves to "bribe" the producer of the
good or service to abate the harm. We also assume initially that nothing is
done by the government about the harm. Competitive equilibrium then
occurs where supply and consumer demand balance-where S and D
intersect. The resulting price and quantity are denoted pc and QC,
respectively. This level of output is economically excessive, however,
because price is below the social marginal cost of production (Pc < S + t at
QC). That is, the value of the last unit of output to the marginal consumer is
Pc, but the marginal cost of that unit of output to society exceeds that
amount (by the value of the external harm t). The economically efficient
level of output in this industry (assuming for the moment that abatement of
the harm through means other than a reduction in output is infeasible) is
instead determined by the intersection of the functions D and S + t at the
quantity QO < QC and price PO > Pc. At this level of output, consumers
value all units of output at an amount that equals or exceeds their social
marginal cost of production.
71. A competitive industry will produce output as long as the price equals or exceeds
marginal cost. Thus, the last unit produced at any price will have a marginal cost equal to the
price.
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This analysis makes out the standard case for government intervention
to repair the market failure caused by the externality. If the government
knows about the externality and the magnitude of the associated harm, it
can impose a corrective tax (often termed a Pigouvian tax)" equal to t on
each transaction in the industry. Consumers then face the supply curve S + t
instead of S, and the new competitive equilibrium will occur at the efficient
point where D and S + t intersect. Such a Pigouvian tax, set at the proper
level, forces the parties to the transactions that create the external harm to
internalize the externality. That is, the purchasers of the good or service that
causes the external harm now bear not only the marginal cost of producing
the good or service to the firm that sells it, but also the marginal cost of the
external harm to third parties. They respond by purchasing the good or
service only up to the point where their valuation of it would no longer
cover the social marginal cost of production. Putting aside the
administrative costs of this system, the result of a properly calibrated
Pigouvian tax is to induce the market to behave efficiently. 3 In the
environmental arena, this proposition supports what is often known as the
"polluter pays" principle.74
Of course, Pigouvian taxes are not the only possible solution to
externality problems. Criminal proceedings, private litigation, and
command-and-control regulation can also address external harms, and, if
they are administered and calibrated properly, they can mimic the
equilibrium that results from an efficient Pigouvian tax.
It is also possible, as Coase emphasizes, that the parties affected by
external harms will bargain to a satisfactory solution, even if that means
that those who are victimized must pay those who create the harms to abate
them.75 Our analysis of regulatory correctives presupposes that Coasean
bargaining is not a superior solution. This assumption seems compelling in
the Internet setting, as it is exceedingly unlikely that all fifty states will
come together through bargaining to address the problems that have been
the subject of state regulation in the area. We certainly see nothing of the
sort thus far.
Up to this point in the analysis, it is of no moment whether the external
harm befalls people in the same jurisdiction as the activity that creates it.
72. See A.C. PIcOU, THE EcONOMICS OF WELFARE 192-96 (4th ed. 1932).
73. If partial or complete abatement of the harm is possible through means other than a
reduction in output (pollution-control technology, for example), the analysis is much the same.
The proper Pigouvian tax will still equal the value of the external harm from each unit of output,
although the tax must adjust in accordance with whatever abatement measures are in place.
Producers of the harm will then have a choice between paying the tax and investing in abatement
measures that reduce or eliminate the tax. They will choose the most cost-effective option, and the
resulting equilibrium with a possibly lower or zero tax due to abatement will also be efficient.
74. See FR1EDMAN, supra note 61, at 520 (discussing effluent fees charged to polluters).
75. Coase, supra note 70, at 6-8.
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Likewise, if the harm does cross jurisdictional boundaries, it matters not in
principle which jurisdiction takes the corrective action.
If we add a political economy dimension to the analysis, however, we
might predict that the citizenship of the individuals harmed by an
externality and of those benefiting from the transactions that generate it
may well affect the likely locus of any corrective response. The parties to
the transactions that create the externality may derive little or no benefit
from the corrective measures, and hence may be unlikely to pressure their
governing officials to fix the problem. By contrast, those who are harmed
by the externality may well demand political action to ameliorate it. Where
the latter group is concentrated in a particular jurisdiction, therefore, we
might predict that this jurisdiction will be the most likely candidate to
attempt intervention.
If the jurisdiction in which the harm arises takes appropriately
measured action, calibrated as above to the magnitude of the harm caused
by the externality, it can correct the problem and induce an efficient
equilibrium as in Figure 1. Plainly, such corrective action will have
consequences outside of the jurisdiction taking action. The price charged to
consumers of the good or service associated with the externality will rise (in
Figure 1, from Pc to PO) wherever the consumers are located. The
aggregate profits of firms producing the good or service at issue will fall.7
6
Notwithstanding the fact that these costs may be borne to a great extent by
people outside of the jurisdiction taking corrective action, they are fully
consistent with that action producing a gain in economic welfare from an
internalization of the externality.
Of course, if the external harm from a transaction falls primarily in one
jurisdiction, and the benefits of the transaction fall primarily in others, a
simple political economy analysis raises a cautionary flag.77 Often, as in
Figure 1, some level of the external harm is economically desirable because
the costs of eliminating it would exceed the benefits. But if the jurisdiction
taking action sees only the harm and none of the benefits, it may be
motivated to take excessive corrective action. If the harm from a unit of
output is t, as in Figure 1, but a jurisdiction imposes in some fashion a tax
or penalty greater than t per unit of output, price will be forced above its
efficient level (PO) and output will be reduced below its efficient level
(QO). If the tax is large enough, overall economic welfare can decline.
76. This effect can be seen in Figure 1 as a decline in the producer surplus earned by sellers.
In the initial competitive equilibrium, producer surplus is depicted as the area below the dashed
line at Pc, above the function S, and to the left of the function D. After the corrective tax is
imposed, producer surplus falls to the area below the dashed line at P0, above S + t, and to the left
of D.
77. See Fischel, supra note 28, at 75; Levmore, supra note 64, at 570-75.
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Thus, where harms cross jurisdictional boundaries, there may at times
be a need for some mechanism to ensure that corrective measures are
properly calibrated. Mechanisms may also be necessary to ensure that
properly calibrated correctives imposed by one jurisdiction are effective in
another. The mere fact that measures undertaken by one jurisdiction have
effects on citizens elsewhere, however, is by itself no objection to them. As
Figure 1 suggests, one state's regulation of cross-border externalities will
typically cause prices to rise and output to fall for the out-of-state industries
that generate the externalities. From an economic standpoint, the issue is
not whether correction of cross-border externalities will produce these out-
of-state effects, but rather whether the magnitude of these effects is
appropriate.
C. Balancing, Extraterritoriality, and Inconsistent Regulations
The Internet cases involve one state regulating cross-border harms
caused by Internet communications that originate in another state. Courts
applying the dormant Commerce Clause address these regulations under the
rubrics of balancing analysis, extraterritoriality, and inconsistent
regulations. Below we offer observations from the economic perspective on
the proper interpretation of these three strands of doctrine. Our analysis is
limited to cases in which states police externalities, and may not afford a
complete perspective on the dormant Commerce Clause in other factual
contexts.78
1. Balancing Analysis
As we illustrated in the preceding Section, appropriate correctives for
nonpecuniary externalities yield net welfare gains to society as a whole.
When a proper corrective tax is imposed, the losses to the consumers (from
higher prices) and the producers (from lower profits) are exceeded by the
gains to the regulating state (in tax revenue) plus the gains to those harmed
by the externality (from a reduced level of harm). This remains true when
the producers of the good or service in question are outside of the
regulating jurisdiction-along with many, if not all, of the consumers-and
those hurt by the external harm are primarily inside the regulating
jurisdiction.
To recast this point in the language of balancing, we can say that the
benefits to the regulating jurisdiction and its citizens exceed the losses to
those outside the jurisdiction; that is, the regulatory benefits exceed the
78. E.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (holding that the dormant
Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing a use tax on mail-order firms).
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burden on commerce. Whenever regulatory policy corrects for external
harms in a precisely optimal fashion, economic welfare will rise; the gains
to those who benefit then exceed the losses to those who suffer. If all state
regulation of external harms embodied the ideal corrective response,
therefore, there would be no role for balancing analysis because the
outcome of such analysis would always favor the regulation in question.
But for various reasons, including limited information and defects in the
political process, states may not impose the ideal corrective for external
harm. When states correct for external harms in an imperfect fashion, the
question arises whether they have perhaps made things worse. This
question is what balancing analysis seeks to address.
To continue with our illustration, imagine that the regulating state
imposes some Pigouvian tax on output in response to the external harm, but
that for some reason it does not equal t. It is not difficult to show that any
tax less than or equal to t will nevertheless improve overall economic
welfare (administrative costs again to the side) by inducing a reduction in
output toward the social optimum. If the tax exceeds t, however, it is
straightforward to show that output will fall below the social optimum. And
if the tax exceeds t by an amount that is large enough, the possibility arises
that economic welfare will decline relative to the situation with no
corrective for the external harm at all.
The function of balancing analysis in the scrutiny of state regulation is,
in a rough way, to check whether state regulation makes things better or
worse in this fashion. This conclusion says nothing, of course, about the
relative competence of various institutions to perform the balancing
analysis. We return to the problem of comparative institutional competence
below.
2. Extraterritorial Regulation
We now offer an economic interpretation of the dormant Commerce
Clause decisions that evince concern for extraterritorial regulation. As we
have shown, a proper corrective measure put in place by one jurisdiction for
a harm that originates elsewhere will generally have some impact outside
the regulating jurisdiction. The fact that a state regulation of cross-border
harms has an impact on out-of-state actors cannot by itself be the
touchstone for illegality under the extraterritorial-regulation strand of
analysis. State regulations are routinely upheld despite what is obviously a
significant impact on outside actors.
We have already offered examples for this point,79 but consider one
more that is similar to a problem presented by Internet communications. A
79. Supra p. 795.
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firm that sells real-space pornography incurs costs in identifying restrictive
"community standards" (which differ not just at the state level, but also at
the local level) and in tailoring the content to that community (which might
entail barring the content from the community altogether).
8" As the
Supreme Court has said with respect to a "dial-a-porn" firm:
[The content provider] is free to tailor its messages, on a selective
basis, if it so chooses, to the communities it chooses to serve. While
[it] may be forced to incur some costs in developing and
implementing a system for screening the locale of incoming calls,
there is no constitutional impediment to enacting a law which may
impose such costs on a medium electing to provide these messages.
Whether [the content provider] chooses to hire operators to
determine the source of the calls or engages with the telephone
company to arrange for the screening and blocking of out-of-area
calls or finds another means for providing messages compatible
with community standards is a decision for the message provider to
make.... If [the fin's] audience is comprised of different
communities with different local standards, [it] ultimately bears the
burden of complying with the prohibition on obscene messages."'
The Court made this comment in a case involving a First Amendment
challenge to a federal statute. But the point is relevant to the dormant
Commerce Clause as well. Real-space pornography providers typically
incur costs in keeping, abreast of regulatory developments in different
communities and in taking steps to comply with the regulations. And yet no
decision suggests that local obscenity laws in real space violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. Multistate firms often face precisely this kind of cost
with respect to varying state tax laws, libel laws, securities requirements,
charitable registration requirements, franchise laws, tort laws, and much
more.
For these reasons, extraterritoriality analysis under the dormant
Commerce Clause must be more fine-grained. It must, that is, distinguish
between permissible and impermissible out-of-state costs that result from
the regulation of cross-border externalities. Consistent with our economic
analysis, we submit that the appropriate statement of the extraterritoriality
concern is that states may not impose burdens on out-of-state actors that
outweigh the in-state benefits in the sense that we described above. This
80. Under the First Amendment, the constitutionality of a prohibition on obscenity turns on
community standards" that differ across (small) jurisdictions. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
24-25 (1973).
81. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989); see also Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974) ("The fact that distributors ... may be subjected to
varying community standards in the various federal judicial districts... does not render a federal
statute unconstitutional .... ").
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understanding of the extraterritoriality concern fits with the Court's modem
extraterritoriality decisions.
Consider Edgar v. MITE Corp.,82 the fount of the modem
extraterritoriality decisions. MITE involved an Illinois antitakeover law that
placed significant prior restraints on tender offers for companies that either
had 10% of their shareholders in Illinois, or for which two of the following
conditions were met: The corporation's headquarters were in Illinois, it was
incorporated in Illinois, or 10% of its capital and paid-in surplus were in
Illinois. 3 The plurality's extraterritoriality analysis emphasized that the
Illinois regulation did far more than necessary to protect Illinois interests. It
noted that the Illinois law prohibited transactions "not only with [target
company] stockholders living in Illinois, but also with those living in other
States and having no connection with Illinois." 84 The plurality further noted
that the act could even "regulate a tender offer which would not affect a
single Illinois shareholder." 85 Immediately after describing these
implications of the act, the plurality concluded that it was "therefore
apparent that the Illinois statute. . has a sweeping extraterritorial effect.
86
MITE can thus be interpreted as saying that an Illinois law with such a
significant out-of-state burden on communications between noncitizens was
not justified by the meager benefits achieved in Illinois.
Other extraterritoriality decisions can also be viewed in this manner.
Recall Healy, the Connecticut case involving beer price affirmation.87 The
Court clearly believed that Connecticut's limitations on the price of beer
sold elsewhere were an excessive response to its regulatory concern of
preventing price gouging within the state. The Court expressed a similar
concern in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, in which it invoked MITE
and Healy in the course of striking down, on due process grounds, an
Alabama award of punitive damages that was designed to change defendant
BMW's lawful conduct in other states.88 As the Court explained, "Alabama
may insist that BMW adhere to a particular disclosure policy in that State,"
but it "does not have the power.., to punish BMW for conduct that was
lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on Alabama or its
residents." 89
82. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
83. Id. at 626-27.
84. Id. at 642 (plurality opinion).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989); see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
88. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
89. Id. at 572-73.
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Our balancing-test gloss on the extraterritoriality decisions does not
accord with some of the Court's overbroad extraterritoriality dicta.90 But it
is consistent with the case outcomes and with the general concerns evinced
in the extraterritoriality decisions. The principle thus makes room for states
to apply properly calibrated correctives for cross-border harms, even if they
produce out-of-state effects. In this sense it serves the dormant Commerce
Clause's purpose of achieving efficiency in interstate relations. The
principle also reconciles the extraterritoriality prong of the dormant
Commerce Clause with the scores of choice-of-law decisions that have
cross-border effects, as well as with constitutional limitations on choice of
law.9" Finally, our gloss on extraterritoriality simplifies dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, for it effectively folds the extraterritoriality concern
into a balancing analysis framework that asks whether a state's regulatory
response to a cross-border harm is "clearly excessive" in relation to its
benefits.92 This means, of course, that the proportionality principle suffers
from the same institutional concerns as balancing analysis, a point to which
we return below.
3. Inconsistent Regulations
We now turn to the inconsistent-regulations prong of dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. The inconsistent-regulations cases do not
concern inconsistencies in the sense that acts required in one state are
prohibited in another. Rather, they concern different regulations across
states that heighten compliance costs for multijurisdictional firms. There is
nothing unusual about nonuniform regulations in our federal system. States
are allowed to make their own regulatory judgments about scores of issues.
The mere fact that states may promulgate different substantive regulations
of the same activity cannot possibly be the touchstone for illegality under
the dormant Commerce Clause.
A more plausible interpretation of the inconsistent-regulations concern
is that nonuniform state regulations might impose compliance costs that are
90. E.g., Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 ("[A] statute that directly controls commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's
authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by
the legislature."); MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43 (plurality opinion) (holding that the dormant
Commerce Clause "precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place
wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effect within the state" ).
Moreover, it is clear that in some cases, the Court acts as if the extraterritoriality and balancing
analyses are distinct. See, e.g., MITE, 457 U.S. at 641-46.
91. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (applying Minnesota law to an
accident in Wisconsin consistent with the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses ); Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (applying a California
workman's compensation law to an employee injured in Alaska consistent with the Full Faith and
Credit Clause).
92. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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so severe that they counsel against permitting the states to regulate a
particular subject matter. At the limit, actors may become subject to
different regulations to such an extent that compliance becomes effectively
impossible if they are to engage in interstate commerce. Similarly, firms
may become subject to regulatory requirements in one jurisdiction that
accomplish no more than different regulatory requirements imposed by
another jurisdiction, with the result that regulatory compliance costs
increase significantly for no good reason. The same regulatory benefits
could be obtained at lower cost if the states simply adopted the same
policies or restated their policies in terms that allowed regulated entities to
comply by choosing among the various equally effective compliance
options. Even in less extreme cases, the proliferation of different state
regulations may impose compliance costs that outweigh any plausible
regulatory benefits. Viewed this way, the inconsistent-regulations cases,
too, are a variant of balancing analysis.93
This principle is also consistent with the decided cases. Begin with the
transportation cases. The Court has been aggressive in invalidating state
transportation safety regulations concerning rail and truck length,
mudguards, and the like.94 These decisions sometimes refer to the evil of
inconsistent regulations 9 and sometimes make conclusory references to the
need for uniformity.96 But it is clear that the cases turn on the judicial
judgment that the regulatory benefits of the transportation regulation were
illusory while the costs of complying with the local regulation were severe.
The same is true of the inconsistent-regulations analysis in the state
takeover cases. MITE made no mention of the inconsistent-regulations
concern. But its successor case, CTS,97 distinguished MITE in the course of
rejecting an inconsistent-regulations claim. One basis for the distinction
was that Indiana's statute was more narrowly tailored than Illinois's,
applying only to corporations incorporated in Indiana. Finally, the price-
affirmation cases tie the concern with inconsistent regulations to the
concern for extraterritoriality 98 -a concern that, as we explained above, is
at bottom about the proportionality of regulatory response.
93. Cf. Fischel, supra note 28, at 90 (suggesting a balancing-test interpretation of CTS Corp.
v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987)).
94. E.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (invalidating an Iowa
restriction on truck length); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978)
(invalidating a Wisconsin regulation barring 65-foot double trucks); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (invalidating an Illinois mudguard regulation); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761 (1945) (invalidating an Arizona regulation limiting train lengths); see also Regan,
supra note 62, at 1092 (noting that transportation cases are balancing cases).
95. E.g., Bibb, 359 U.S. at 526-27.
96. E.g., S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 770-71, 774.
97. 481 U.S. 69.
98. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y.
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1986).
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In sum, inconsistent-regulations cases, like extraterritoriality cases,
should be viewed as just another variant of balancing analysis. One of the
risks of allowing the states to regulate is the possibility that different
regulatory judgments may create costs of compliance with the various state
regimes that are clearly out of proportion to the benefits of permitting
decentralized regulation. When this problem arises, state regulations can be
struck down, leaving national regulation as an alternative, and often leaving
open the possibility that less restrictive alternatives at the state level may
survive scrutiny.
Ill. INTERNET EXTERNALITIES, STATE REGULATION, AND
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
We now turn to the problem of Internet externalities. Should the
"polluter pays" principle apply to the harm to minors from the availability
of pornography and the harm to e-mail users from unwanted bulk e-mail? If
so, are state regulations of these activities a reasonable way to induce the
producers of Internet externalities to internalize them? Or are they
excessive in one of the dimensions described above?
The answers to these questions turn on empirical matters that we cannot
fully resolve, and so we do not offer definitive answers. Our aim here is to
rectify the analytical confusion that prevails in the judicial decisions and
commentary, and to suggest that the case against state regulation in this
area is not nearly as clear or simple as the courts would seem to have it. We
begin by explaining why judicial assumptions about the architecture of the
Internet are flawed and why transjurisdictional control of Internet content is
increasingly feasible. Against this background, we consider the balancing,
extraterritoriality, and inconsistency prongs of dormant Commerce Clause
analysis.
A. Identification and Filtering
The Internet dormant Commerce Clause decisions assume that content
providers cannot know where or to whom content goes and cannot control
the distribution of content by geography or age. These assumptions are
important. For if Internet content providers could cheaply and easily
identify receivers in restrictive jurisdictions, they could tailor their
communications to comply with each state's law, just as multistate firms
tailor their products to comply with differing state libel, consumer
protection, franchise, or pornography laws. We consider the validity of
these assumptions with respect to the two most important Internet services:
the World Wide Web (which is at issue in the porn cases) and e-mail
(which is at issue in the spam cases).
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1. World Wide Web
It is a mistake to claim that Web content providers cannot control
content flows on the World Wide Web. They frequently do this by
conditioning access to content on the presentation of payment
information. 9 They can also condition access on the presentation of
geographical or age identification. The process of conditioned access can,
of course, be costly. If a content receiver must establish geographical
identification by sending the content provider a facsimile, or establish age
identification by mailing to the content provider a copy of a driver's
license, the process of content distribution slows significantly. We discuss
the extent of these costs in a moment. The point for now is that the pertinent
issue is not the impossibility of geographical and age identification and
filtering, but rather the cost and effectiveness of these services.
Age Identification. There are several ways that content providers can
verify the age of a content receiver and thus, through conditioned access,
block underage receivers' access to content. The most successful method is
to condition access on the presentation of an adult personal identification
number (PIN)."° In a matter of minutes and for no charge, website
operators can obtain the software needed to operate this system from one of
twenty-five or so adult identification firms.10' Website operators can earn
commissions of up to sixty percent of fees generated by the adult
identification services.0 2 The adult identification firms, in turn, charge
approximately seventeen dollars for receivers to obtain an adult PIN
(although firms are now beginning to offer the adult PINs for free).03 As of
February 1999, one adult identification firm, Adult Check, had issued
approximately three million valid PINs, and these PINs were accepted by
approximately 46,000 websites.Y'
Age identification technology is an effective way to condition content
on satisfaction of age criteria, and it can even generate revenues for the
content provider. But the technology has costs as well, both to the content
provider and to the receiver. The webpage operator must organize
99. This is true, for example, of Web gambling operators, such as Planet Luck,
http://www.planetluck.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2000), and of some financial service pages, such
as WSJ.com (the Wall Street Journal's online page), http://www.wsj.com (last visited Nov. 22,
2000).
100. Other methods that are currently less effective include credit card verification, content-
filtering software, and digital certificates.
101. Such as Adult Check, http://www.adultcheck.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2000).
102. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,489 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
103. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 170-71 & n.15 (3d Cir. 2000). To obtain an adult PIN,
one must pay by credit card online, or fax or mail an application and a check and a copy of a
passport or driver's license to the adult identification firm. ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 490. The
online process takes a few minutes.
104. ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
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prohibited content on the webpage behind the adult screen and must
implement tools (provided for free by the adult identification services) to
prevent fraud. Content receivers in every jurisdiction (including permissive
jurisdictions) who desire to obtain content behind the adult screen must take
the time to obtain an adult PIN and must pay a small sum for it. Such
individuals must reveal personal information to obtain a PIN. Many find
these costs to be excessive and therefore will not acquire a PIN. In turn,
these costs can lead to a loss of traffic for content providers who must
condition access on age identification."'
Geographical Filtering. Many of the techniques for age identification
can also be used for geographical identification. For example, an address
associated with a credit card can be used as proof of geographical
identification. There are special costs associated with this method of
identification. The credit card provides only a permanent address, and the
user might be temporarily located at a computer in another jurisdiction. But
this will very much be the exception rather than the rule. More significant is
the fact that it currently costs hundreds and perhaps thousands of dollars to
establish and maintain a credit identification system.' There are at present
no third-party firms akin to the age identification services that provide
geographical PINs via credit cards.
Much more promising are developing technologies that allow webpage
content providers instantly to determine the content receiver's geographical
identity on the basis of the Internet protocol (IP) address of the user's
computer.' 7 Several firms now provide software with algorithms that
identify the geographical source of a content receiver's IP address.' The
algorithms determine the geographical identity of the content receiver by
cross-comparing results from (1) a mapping of IP addresses in the content
105. Id. at 491.
106. Id. at 488.
107. The information in this and the following paragraph is based on a technical
memorandum by Infosplit.com, a leading geographical identification firm, Memorandum,
InfoSplit Core Technology (Sept. 25, 2000) (on file with authors) [hereinafter InfoSplit memo], as
well as on interviews with two experts on geographical filtering of the Internet, Telephone
Interview with Martin Hald, Xdrive.com (Sept. 18, 2000); Telephone Interview with Cyril Houri,
InfoSplit.com (Sept. 7, 2000), various news reports, e.g., Stefanie Olsen, Geographic Tracking
Raises Opportunities, Fears, at http:lwww.news.cnet.comlnews/0-1005-200.3424168.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2000), and the findings in the recent Yahoo decision, Ligue Contre le Racisme et
L'Antis~mitisme v. Yahoo! Inc., T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.juriscom.
netltxt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis2000ll2O.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2001); infra notes 165-167 and
accompanying text. This technology is in flux, and nothing in our analysis turns on the precise
accuracy of this information. The point that matters is that geographical filtering is increasingly
feasible at some cost, that cost is dropping, and courts should inquire into these costs on a
contemporary basis in performing a dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
108. E.g., Akamai, http://www.akamai.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2001) (using EdgeScape
technology); BorderControl.com, http://www.bordercontrol.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2000);
Digital Island, http://www.digitalisland.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2001) (using TraceWare
technology); InfoSplit, http://www.infosplt.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2001).
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receiver's header with IP address databases, and (2) a tracer analysis of the
path of the Internet transmission, which is checked against a database of the
nodes through which the transmission traveled and their geographic
location. While neither method, taken alone, is sufficiently accurate,
redundant cross-referencing of these databases holds the promise to be
extraordinarily accurate. This software can be installed in the content
provider's webpage, allowing the provider to tailor content to comply with
differing regulations in each geographical unit.
This system has advantages and disadvantages when compared to age
identification technology. On the advantage side, content providers can
determine receivers' geographical identification without the content
receiver having to do anything. The system operates invisibly from the
content receiver's perspective. There are thus no privacy costs associated
with the content receiver's disclosure of personal information. Similarly,
content receivers in permissive jurisdictions do not have to incur the cost of
acquiring an identification in order to obtain content. In this sense
geographical identification is more fine-grained than age identification.
Among its disadvantages, geographical identification is at the moment
significantly more expensive for the webpage operator than age
identification technology, which is free. It is also less accurate, at least for
now. The technology correctly identifies the content receivers'
geographical identity at the national level between ninety and ninety-eight
percent of the time, but at the state level only eighty to ninety-five percent
of the time.' °9 It currently works even less well with the twenty-five million
America Online customers who use AOL's proprietary proxy server."0
Finally, these geographical identification technologies can presently be
defeated by Internet anonymizers, remote sessions via Telnet, and remote
dial-up connections.
Many firms already use geographical identification technologies, both
to tailor content by geography and to comply with various territorial laws."'
Although these technologies are imperfect, the imperfections have
109. See InfoSplit memo, supra note 107; Telephone Interview with Martin Hald, supra note
107; Telephone Interview with Cyril Houri, supra note 107; Olsen, supra note 107.
110. See Telephone Interview with Martin Hald, supra note 107; Telephone Interview with
Cyril Houri, supra note 107; Olsen, supra note 107.
111. To take three of many examples: JumpTV.com uses geographical filtering to ensure that
its retransmission of television signals via the Internet in Canada does not enter the United States
and thereby violate U.S. copyright law. Steven Bonisteel, JumpTV Aims To Be Next iCraveTV-
Without Lawsuits, at http://www.newsbytes.com/pubnews/00/155297.html (Sept. 15, 2000).
Medical and science publisher HiWire Publishing relies on geographic filtering software "to
avoid criminal liability for advertising pharmaceuticals on the Web in countries where they are
banned." Max Smetannikov, Digital Island To Release "Traceware," at http://www.zdnet.coml
filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,2338594-35,00.html (Sept. 21, 2000). And Nevada's recent Internet
gambling scheme uses a technology that ensures that gambling is taking place in Nevada. Ronna
Abramson, Nevada Takes Small Step for Online Gambling, at http://www.thestandard.con
article/display/0,1 151,19410,00.html (Oct. 13, 2000).
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solutions, and there is good reason to believe that geographical
identification technology will be precise and inexpensive in the near future.
In the meantime, many will point to the imperfections and conclude that the
technologies are "unworkable" 1l2 or "futile." '" This is a persistent error in
thinking about Internet regulation; the conclusion simply does not follow
from the premise. Regulatory slippage is a fact of life in real space and
cyberspace alike. One does not conclude from the fact that minors obtain
and use fake identification to purchase beer, or that thieves sometimes crack
safes, or that gray-market goods are imported into the United States, that
drinking laws and criminal laws and trademark laws are useless. Nor should
one assume that imperfections in Internet identification and filtering
technology render these technologies useless. Regulation works by raising
the cost of the proscribed activity, not necessarily by eliminating it.
114
Computer-savvy users might always be able to circumvent identification
technology, just as burglars can circumvent alarm systems. But they would
do so at a certain cost, and this cost would be prohibitive for most.
2. Electronic Mail
Unlike the World Wide Web, which involves a two-way transmission
between the content receiver and sender, e-mail transmissions are one-way
transmissions from the content sender to the receiver." 5 When combined
with the fact that e-mail addresses do not necessarily (or even usually)
correspond with a geographic location, the result is that it is at present
extraordinarily costly for a spammer to identify and screen persons in
prohibited jurisdictions ex ante. It is easy to imagine ways to alter the
architecture of the Net to change this fact. For example, a jurisdiction that
wishes to prohibit spam could maintain a registry of e-mail addresses that
the spammer would have to check and accommodate (using software that
removes these addresses from the spam list) prior to sending the spare." 6
No state has yet done this, however." 7
112. Burk, supranote 11,at 1114.
113. Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 1374.
114. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1223-24, 1229-30; Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1405 (1996).
115. Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical
Model, 98 MICH. L. REv. 395,427 & n.102 (1999).
116. Senator Robert Torricelli has proposed something like this in national legislation: the
Electronic Mailbox Protection Act of 1997, S. 875, 105th Cong. (1997).
117. The state of Washington maintains a registry of e-mail addresses of Washington
residents who do not want to receive sparn. Wash. Ass'n of Internet Serv. Providers, WAISP
Registry Page, at http://registry.waisp.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2001). But in order to ensure that
the registry itself is not used as a spanming database, addresses registered on it can be verified
only one address at a time.
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Fortunately, ex ante identification and filtering are unnecessary in this
context, for none of the antispam statutes prohibit unsolicited commercial
e-mails outright. Rather, they simply require spammers to label subject
lines and headers accurately or provide clear information to allow the
receiver to easily remove herself from the spamming list.118 To be sure,
compliance with these various laws still imposes costs on the spammer. To
ensure compliance with the various antispam laws, he must accurately label
headers and subject lines, start subject lines when appropriate with "ADV"
or "ADLT," establish a valid e-mail reply system, and comply with
requests to be removed from e-mail lists. Because there is no cost-effective
way (at present) to identify e-mail addresses by geography, he must take
these steps even for e-mail recipients in jurisdictions where these steps are
not required.
With these thoughts in mind, we turn to the dormant Commerce Clause.
B. Balancing Analysis
The claim that the burdens of state Internet regulations are excessive in
relation to their local benefits turns on complicated predictions about the
economic effects of Internet regulations. We aim not to show that the
Internet regulations are cost-justified, but rather that judicial cost-benefit
analyses to date have been seriously flawed. We address the pornography
statutes and the spain statutes in turn. We then query whether Congress
might be better suited than the federal judiciary to perform this cost-benefit
analysis.
1. Pornography Statutes
The decisions invalidating state pornography statutes on dormant
Commerce Clause grounds acknowledged that the pornography statutes'
aim of protecting children from exposure to pornography "is a
quintessentially legitimate state objective." 19 These decisions concluded,
however, that the local benefits of the statutes were small because the state
laws had no effect on communications abroad and had been interpreted to
apply to pictorial and not textual materials. The courts also concluded that
the burdens of the laws on interstate commerce were "extreme" because
the laws "cast[] [their] nets worldwide" and because "the chilling effect
that [the statutes] produce [was] bound to exceed the actual cases that are
118. Supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
119. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160,179 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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likely to be prosecuted, as Internet users will steer clear of the [statutes] by
a significant margin." 120
It is true that the absence of coverage for textual communications
reduces the protection afforded to minors. But under the dormant
Commerce Clause, states have broad discretion to determine the nature and
scope of the local harm they wish to redress. States' narrowing of the
statutes can be viewed as a reasonable effort to balance concerns about
exposure to pornography against competing concerns about restricting adult
free speech. The statutes still protect minors against pictorial
representations of a sexually explicit nature, and in conjunction with other
state laws that protect children against sexual exploitation,' this narrower
Internet regulation might fully address the concerns of parents in the
jurisdiction. The courts certainly have not offered any reason to think
otherwise, and in any event courts applying the dormant Commerce Clause
should not lightly "second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers
concerning the utility of legislation." 22
The fact that the statutes cannot be applied as a practical matter to
websites overseas, whose operators are not realistically subject to
prosecution in the United States, also reduces their efficacy. But this
reduction in efficacy does not make the regulations worthless and does not
suffice to establish that their local benefits are outweighed by their burdens.
State governments can regulate content flows from abroad even if the
offshore website providers lack presence or assets within the state.'23
Minors might not be perfectly able to substitute unblocked foreign
websites.'24 Foreign jurisdictions may undertake measures to prevent
minors from accessing pornographic material found on sites within their
jurisdictions. And even if foreign websites were perfect substitutes for
domestic ones, the purposes of the state statutes would still be served to
120. Id.
121. See id. (discussing such state laws).
122. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987) (citations omitted).
123. Most prominently, they can regulate the in-state financial intermediaries and Internet
service providers that facilitate Internet communications with offshore sites. See Goldsmith, supra
note 3, at 1222-23; Jack Goldsmith, Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1119,1223-27 (1999).
124. On the assumption that pornography sites from the United States were effectively
blocked to children in regulating states, children would incur costs, perhaps nontrivial costs, in
substituting unblocked foreign pornography websites. On most search engines, searches using
terms such as "sex" or "nude" produce an enormous number of popular U.S. sites that children
would have to cull through before finding foreign, unregulated sites. This could be a time-
consuming process that would deter children's access at the margin. Of course, clever children
can circumvent this process, blocking regulations in the United States might lead foreign sites to
become more prevalent, and discrimination technology can make it easier for children to reach
desired offshore sites. It still seems likely, however, that substitution to foreign websites would
not be costless on average. The last five years of Internet history have made it clear that territorial
governments can, through a variety of means, raise the cost of Internet flows from abroad. See
sources cited supra note 123.
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some extent by this forced substitution, for it would be more difficult for
the substituted foreign content-providers to exploit New York children
sexually."2 Any serious cost-benefit analysis of the state Internet
regulations must take these factors into account. No court to date has
considered them.
More significantly, the courts' emphasis on the inability of states to
enforce their laws against foreign websites weakens the claim that the
pornography statutes will be a significant burden on interstate commerce.
Foreign webpage operators cannot be burdened by a criminal law that
cannot be enforced against them. But there are significant hurdles against
enforcing such laws even in the United States. For New York to enforce its
criminal law against an offender in California, it must extradite him. But
extradition from one state to another is limited to individuals who have fled
the state that seeks extradition.'26 A website operator who has never had a
presence in the regulating state, therefore, is unlikely to face a realistic
threat of extradition. The point is somewhat less certain with respect to civil
liability. An out-of-state webpage content provider is not subject to
personal jurisdiction in another state unless she has an interactive (as
opposed to passive) website with independent indicia of communication
with that state.'27 But it is false to assume, as the courts have done, that
every website is exposed to liability in every jurisdiction where its content
appears.
These factors suggest that the ability of a state to enforce its rules
against out-of-state website operators may be limited whether they are
foreign or domestic. This point cuts both ways, as it suggests that state
Internet pornography statutes are less effective. But it also suggests that
out-of-state websites need not fear prosecution under the statutes, so that
the "chill" on interstate commerce emphasized in American Libraries
Ass'n 128 is greatly exaggerated.
There is another reason to believe that courts have overstated the extent
of the pornography statutes' chill on Internet commerce. The pornography
statutes contain defenses for defendants who make reasonable efforts to
prevent access by minors, efforts that are satisfied by, among other things, a
verified credit card or adult identification code. These defenses do not
require perfect identification and filtering. They require best efforts. The
content provider thus need not worry about slippage in the effectiveness of
attempts at identification, as long as he makes a good faith effort. The
125. See Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 179 (noting that prevention of sexual
exploitation of minors is a major purpose of the New York statute).
126. E.g., Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 131 (1916); Gee v. Kansas, 912 F.2d 414, 418 (10th
Cir. 1990).
127. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-20 (9th Cir. 1997).
128. 969 F. Supp. at 173-77.
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content providers' worries about misidentification and any attendant chills
on speech are perhaps unacceptable burdens on First Amendment rights.'29
But in the absence of some showing that states are construing these
defenses unreasonably narrowly, there is much less reason to worry about
technological imperfections in the dormant Commerce Clause context. And
there is no reason for the dormant Commerce Clause to credit burdens on
interstate commerce that arise from an unjustified overreaction to a state
regulation.
Here one encounters perhaps the most significant error in the Internet
cases. Courts in these cases erroneously assume that geographical and age
identification technologies are infeasible, and that in any event
technological imperfection renders them useless. 30 The court in American
Libraries Ass'n reached this conclusion based on findings of fact from a
1996 decision, and the other Internet decisions have followed American
Libraries Ass'n on this score without further analysis.' But technology in
this area has improved enormously since then, and it will only continue to
improve in response to demands from parents, governments, and especially
businesses. A genuine cost-benefit analysis must inquire into contemporary
costs of identification and screening. For example, the decision that
American Libraries Ass'n relied on for its assumptions about Internet
architecture determined, in 1996, that adult identification services were
scarce and their products were expensive and imperfect.'32 By the end of
1998, however, there were dozens of such firms serving millions of users,
and their services were free and extraordinarily effective."' The
affordability and accuracy of age identification technology, combined with
the "best efforts" defenses in the pornographic communication statutes,
mean that liability under these statutes can be avoided rather simply and
cheaply. This fact alone means that the pornography statutes should survive
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Of course, age identification
technology carries the costs described above. But these costs are more
relevant to the First Amendment than the dormant Commerce Clause,
where they matter only if they exceed the local benefits from the regulation.
Courts have generally failed to take into account the rapid fall on the cost
side of this equation.
We have focused thus far on analytical errors that cut in favor of state
Internet regulation. But courts have also overlooked two potential concerns
129. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000) (invalidating the Child Online
Protection Act on First Amendment grounds).
130. See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 54-58 (arguing that identification technology, even if
imperfect, facilitates effective Internet regulation); Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1229-30 (same).
131. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text; see also cases cited supra note 45
(following the assumptions in Am. Libraries Ass'n).
132. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845-46 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
133. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,489-92 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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that cut against such regulation. The first concern flows from the fact that
many pornographic communication statutes criminalize the conduct at
issue. As we explained in Part II, it is important that corrective measures for
cross-border harms be properly calibrated to the magnitude of the harms.
The criminal remedy raises a cautionary flag that the penalties imposed by
these statutes might excessively burden interstate commerce relative to the
local benefits.
It is difficult to know whether the criminal penalties are properly
calibrated here, for it is difficult both to place a monetary value on the harm
caused by the exposure of minors to pornography and to translate the
expected criminal penalty faced by a pornographic website operator into
dollar terms. Private civil actions for actual damages against website
operators who expose children to pornography would certainly raise less of
a concern."M On the other hand, criminal penalties administered by the state
can sometimes be a better response to external harms than private damages
actions. If the harm to each citizen is small, and if it is difficult to assemble
and certify a class action, private damages actions may never be filed.
Further, the mere fact that criminal penalties may seem severe in relation to
the harm in question does not prove that they are excessive. If enforcement
actions are expensive to bring or many violators escape detection, the
probability of a penalty being imposed against any one violator may be
quite small, so that a stiffer penalty is required to ensure that the expected
penalty is sufficient for proper deterrence. 135 For these reasons, a state
Internet regulation should not be condemned simply because it relies on
criminal penalties for enforcement. The courts should perhaps scrutinize
criminal penalties to ensure that there is a plausible relationship between
the expected penalty and the harm being addressed. If the costs of
compliance or avoidance to the out-of-state content provider are less than a
properly calibrated penalty, the criminal regulation raises no dormant
Commerce Clause concern.
The second concern is that the state pornography statutes at issue, even
if aimed at legitimate harms, nevertheless excessively micromanage the
solution to those harms. In dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, this
concern is captured by the least-restrictive-means test, which asks whether
the state regulation "could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities."136 The government need not employ "the least
restrictive means conceivable," but rather "must demonstrate narrow
134. An early response to spamming was a common-law action for trespass to chattels. See,
e.g., Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
135. Indeed, economists have long argued that with costly enforcement, high penalties
imposed on rare occasions may be the cheapest way to achieve optimal deterrence. E.g., Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 183-84 (1968).
136. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest-a fit that is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest
served." 137
As applied to the Internet pornography statutes, the least-restrictive-
means test ensures that states have not overlooked clearly more efficient
ways of protecting children from harmful Internet pornography. To the
degree that a variety of methods might be employed to ascertain the age of
a Web surfer visiting a pornographic site, for example, the operator should
be able to select the cheapest alternative, and the best option may vary
across websites. The pornography statutes that have been enacted to date
appear easily to satisfy this standard. The New York statute at issue in
American Libraries Ass'n, for example, gave the website operator a general
defense for using any of a number of devices to ascertain the age of the
user, including credit card and third-party adult verification services."8 A
related concern is whether there are clearly cheaper ways for in-state
content receivers to identify and screen out offending content with the same
degree of accuracy. It is doubtful at the moment whether such screening
technologies exist, but if they did they would be relevant to the balancing
calculus.
2. Spain Statutes
The antispam statutes also address a legitimate state objective. Bulk
e-mail can raise costs to Internet service providers and Internet users in
terms of wasted time, slower operating systems, lost accounts, repairs,
equipment, and the like. In addition, many consumers find sparn more
annoying than real-space junk mail because they are paying for time on the
Internet and because spare, unlike most real-space junk mail, is often not
identifiable from its "cover." 139
The Heckel court acknowledged that reduction of these costs was a
legitimate state purpose. 4 ° But like the court in American Libraries Ass'n,
it concluded that the statute at issue did not achieve this purpose. The court
noted that Washington's truthfulness requirements concerned only the form
137. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). Greater New Orleans Broadcasting applied intermediate
scrutiny in the First Amendment context, but there is no reason to believe that the balancing test
and associated level of least-restrictive-means scrutiny are any different in the dormant Commerce
Clause context.
138. Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
139. See Derek Simmons, No Seconds on Spain, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 389, 390-
97 (1999).
140. State v. Heckel, No. 98-2-25480-7, at 35-36 (Wash. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2000) (oral
transcript).
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of the message and would not redress the costs of span associated with its
bulk.'41 This point has some force. But it overlooks the fact that the
truthfulness requirements (such as the requirement not to misrepresent the
message's Internet origin) make spamming unattractive to the many
fraudulent spammers, thereby reducing the volume of spam. Moreover, the
court's assertion that truthful identification in the subject header would do
little to relieve the annoyance of spam is simply wrong. This identification
alone would allow many people to delete the message without opening it
(which takes time) and perhaps being offended by the content. Once again,
the court here is unusually and inappropriately aggressive in second-
guessing the content and scope of the state's regulatory interest.'42
Even assuming that the antispan laws do not significantly further the
state's interest, it is hard to see how the antispam laws burden interstate
commerce at all. The spam laws essentially require truthfulness in the
header, return address, and subject line of the e-mail. Far from burdening
commerce, the truthfulness requirement facilitates it by eliminating fraud
and deception. Compliance with the various antispam statutes is easy
compared to noncompliance, which requires the spanmer to incur the costs
of forging, re-mailing, and the like.
If there is any concern about the spain statutes, it is that they
excessively micromanage in the sense described above. 4 3 Unlike the
pornography statutes, the span statutes do not give the content provider a
variety of options for compliance. Rather, each regulating state imposes
affirmative requirements (such as header accuracy and subject line
identification) that must be satisfied to avoid liability. While it is not
impossible to comply with these varying state requirements, the same
regulatory end might be achieved more cheaply if spammers were given
other equally feasible options for compliance, such as a state registry of
protected e-mail addresses that could be automatically excluded from a
spanming list.'"
More concretely, the concern is that, for example, one state might
require the spammer to label an advertisement with "ADV" in the subject
line, while another state might pursue the same regulatory end by requiring
a different label, such as "ADVERT." Spammers could comply with both
regulations at a small cost (by putting both "ADV" and "ADVERT" in the
subject line), but there is no conceivable regulatory benefit from this
redundancy. Employing a least-restrictive-means analysis, courts faced with
this issue might require states to explain why they did not coordinate on the
141. Id.
142. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
143. Supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text. As we explained in note 117, these
technologies are potentially self-defeating.
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label of the first mover, or write their regulations in such a way as to deem
a spammer in compliance when it uses the perfectly synonymous label of
another regulating state.
3. Comparative Institutional Competence
The above discussion identified the considerations a decisionmaker
should take into account in determining whether the cross-border harms of
a state Internet regulation are excessive when compared with the
regulation's benefits. Here we offer thoughts on comparative institutional
competence with respect to these considerations.
Congressional inertia, combined with the multitude of state Internet
regulations, leads many to conclude that Congress is not up to the task of
policing the many cross-border harms of state Internet regulations. Federal
courts, by contrast, can police a much broader array of cases. In theory,
they can also respond more quickly to the rapid changes in technology that
are so central to the balancing calculus. But there is a growing consensus
that courts, though perhaps competent to enforce an antidiscrimination
regime, are ill-suited to make the many difficult value judgments that the
balancing test requires. Commentators have made this point for years. 45
Recently, the Supreme Court has begun to express skepticism about its
ability to balance.'46 It is probably no accident that few of its decisions in
the past twenty years have turned on a balancing analysis.'47 These concerns
have particular valence in the Internet context. As we have shown, courts
have failed properly to identify and weigh the costs and benefits of state
Internet regulations.
145. See Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST.
COMMENT. 395, 407-10 (1986); Regan, supra note 62, at 1147-54; Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory
Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 43-45 (1999); Tushnet,
supra note 64, at 160-61.
146. In a recent Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause decision, every opinion
acknowledged the Court's relative incompetence at balancing. Gen. Motors v. Tracy, 519 U.S.
278, 308-09 (1997) (" [The] Court is institutionally unsuited to gather the facts upon which
economic predictions can be made, and professionally untrained to make them. We are
consequently ill qualified to develop Commerce Clause doctrine dependent on any such predictive
judgments." (citations omitted)); id. at 312-13 (Scalia, J., concurring) (affirming Scalia's
opposition to dormant Commerce Clause balancing); id. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that "speculation about the 'real-world economic effects' of a decision like this one is beyond our
institutional competence"). On this reading of Tracy, see Regan, supra note 69, at 15-18. Among
the Justices, Scalia has pressed the case against balancing most vigorously. E.g., Tyler Pipe Indus.
v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,259-65 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
147. Among the forty or so dormant Commerce Clause decisions during the past twenty
years, only two-Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988), and
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)-tumned on a balancing rationale. In Bendix, the Court
suggested that balancing was unnecessary because the statute in question, a discriminatory tolling
provision, "might have been held to be a discrimination that invalidates without extended
inquiry." 486 U.S. at 891. For a count and analysis of dormant Commerce Clause cases since
1980, see Regan, supra note 69.
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The Internet context might provide special reasons to expect political
solutions at the federal level. Congressional inertia seems less of a problem
in this context. Unlike many of the subjects that form the basis for dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny, the Internet is an extraordinarily important
phenomenon for the United States, and Congress and several federal
agencies have shown extensive interest in it. 41 Indeed, Congress has paid
special attention to the pornography and span issues that have been most
subject to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. It has enacted two statutes
regulating child pornography, both of which have been invalidated under
the First Amendment. 49 And there are several antispam bills pending in
Congress, one of which has been approved by the House. 50
In one respect, this nascent federal legislation makes the dormant
Commerce Clause issues seem less urgent, for it suggests that Congress
might resolve the substantive issues on its own. But this perspective is too
static. Federal laws addressing porn and spam on the Internet have
benefited enormously from the various state attempts to regulate these
issues. Congress has learned from and drawn explicitly on the experience
(and errors) of the state legislatures, which can address these issues more
quickly than Congress.' 5 ' Experimentation is especially important with
respect to regulation of fast-changing new technologies. Going forward, the
aggressive regime of judicial invalidation of state Internet regulations
threatens to pretermit this useful state experimentation in various contexts.
It also makes it likely that there will be underregulation of Internet
transactions until Congress acts, and possibly suboptimal legislation even
when Congress acts (because of the relative absence of experimental
evidence). There may also be reasons to prefer state heterogeneity in the
regulatory approach for the reasons given earlier relating to differences
across states in taste and culture. 52
It follows from these reflections that judges should be cautious in
striking down a state Internet regulation under a balancing rationale.
However, we do not go so far as to say that they should never do so, for
there may indeed be situations when a balancing analysis reveals that a state
Internet regulation's costs are clearly excessive in comparison to its
benefits.
148. See generally Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward,
71 COLO. L. REV. 1203 (2000) (describing recent Internet regulations).
149. Supra note 4.
150. Unsolicited Electronic Mail Act of 1999, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. (2000).
151. See, e.g., Miller Proposes Bill To Can Spam, at http://techlawjournal.com/congl06/
spamV19990610.htm (June 10, 1999) (describing pending federal spam legislation modeled after
California's antispam law).
152. See supra Section H.A.
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C. Extraterritoriality
In the pornography cases, courts reason that because Web content
providers cannot know the location or age of the receiver, they must
comply with the law of the regulating jurisdiction to avoid prosecution,
thereby reducing available content for receivers outside the regulating
jurisdiction. The assumption here that a content provider is unable to
identify the user by age or geography is, as we suggested above,
incorrect.' 53 In this light, the concern must be restated as follows: Web
content providers might find the costs of compliance with the pornography
statutes (that is, geographical identification and screening costs) to be
greater than the costs of removing offending content from the webpage,
thereby affecting the availability of content for receivers in nonrestrictive
jurisdictions. Alternatively, content providers might pass along the costs of
geographic identification required by regulating jurisdictions to content
receivers in nonregulating states. A final extrastate cost of the pornography
regulations might be that the adult PIN required by content providers to
comply with regulating states' restrictions chills the activities of potential
content receivers in nonregulating states. The extrastate costs of the
antispam statutes are presumably similar.
As we have shown, these out-of-state costs do not necessarily or even
usually implicate dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Proper correctives
for cross-border externalities typically impose costs that affect parties
outside of the jurisdiction. Far from being undesirable, these effects might
well be efficient. Absent a showing that the out-of-state costs are clearly
excessive under the balancing analysis outlined above, they should not
trigger condemnation under the dormant Commerce Clause.
American Libraries Ass'n itself reveals the difficulty with extending
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny to the type of out-of-state regulatory
effects that we have defended. American Libraries Ass'n assumed, in dicta,
that New York's criminalization of the sale of obscene materials to children
over the Internet would survive the extraterritoriality prong of the dormant
Commerce Clause. 4 The court offered no reason for its differential
treatment of New York's prohibition on pornographic communications with
minors and its prohibition on the sale of obscenity to minors. While the
prohibitions differ in substance, as applied to the Internet their
extraterritorial effects are identical: Both regulations affect the pricing
decisions of Web content providers in other states, and this influence on
price may affect consumers in permissive jurisdictions outside of New
York. Such differential treatment suggests that the court's extraterritoriality
153. See supra notes 100-114 and accompanying text.
154. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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reasoning may be flawed. Indeed, as we have explained, the court's logic
would condemn an extraordinary array of state laws as applied to cross-
border activity that no one heretofore viewed as problematic.
D. Inconsistent Regulations
Courts applying the inconsistent-regulations criterion in the Internet
cases worry that an Internet content provider faces fifty different standards
of conduct within the United States and that such "haphazard and
uncoordinated" 155 state regulation violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
We have shown that both on the Web and by e-mail, it is rarely impossible
to comply with all fifty state Internet regulations. The factual issue is
almost always the cost, not the possibility, of compliance; the legal issue is
the balance of costs and benefits, not inconsistency. As we have
emphasized, it is common for firms doing business in the United States to
incur costs learning about and complying with fifty state regulations. To the
extent that courts in the Internet context have attempted to weigh these
costs against legitimate local benefits, they have committed manifold
errors. Absent a showing that the local regulation is excessive under the
balancing test, a point we have questioned above, 156 there should be no
further concern about inconsistent Internet regulations.
IV. EXTENSIONS AND COMPARISONS
We have focused thus far on state antipornography and antispam
statutes. But the dormant Commerce Clause potentially condemns a wide
array of other state Internet regulations. Below we briefly sketch how the
analysis applies to these other state regulations. We also touch on how
analogous problems are handled on the international stage.
A. Domestic Extensions
Some so-called Internet regulations do not in fact necessitate any
Internet-specific analysis. Consider three recent dormant Commerce Clause
challenges to state bans on cross-border sales via the Internet. Winemakers
who want to sell directly to consumers over the Internet are challenging
state requirements that restrict the sources-both in-state and out-of-state-
from which out-of-state wine can be bought.'57 Automakers who want to
155. lId at 183.
156. Supra Section ILI.B.
157. E.g., Swedenburg v. Kelly, No. 00 Civ. 0778, 2000 WL 1264285 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5,
2000).
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sell cars directly to consumers via the Internet are challenging state laws
that prohibit manufacturers from selling cars directly to consumers.'58 And
a cigarette manufacturer is challenging a New York regulation that
effectively precludes the sale of cigarettes via the Internet by prohibiting
interstate cigarette shipments directly to consumers.159
These state regulations might or might not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause, depending on whether they discriminate against
interstate commerce or fail the balancing test. (The wine cases are
especially complex because of the Twenty-First Amendment. 6°) But the
fact that the communications before sale take place over the Internet does
not mean that any unusual problems are presented under the dormant
Commerce Clause. This is because these cases involve the sale and delivery
of real-space goods. Unlike cases involving the transmission of digital
goods over the Internet, the out-of-state provider of real-space goods knows
the real-space location of the recipient and can take steps to keep the
offending goods out of the regulating jurisdiction. To be sure, these steps
impose costs: The content provider must determine where the goods are
going and research and comply with local regulations. But these are the
same costs faced by the out-of-state seller when orders are placed by mail
or telephone. As we made clear above, these costs are commonplace in our
federal system and do not usually implicate dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny.
Here one can draw a general lesson: Concerns about the cross-border
costs of state Internet regulation are heightened when the sale and
transmission of digital goods as opposed to real-space goods are at issue.
The pornography and spain cases are harder than the wine, automobile, and
cigarette cases precisely because in the former context it appears more
costly for out-of-state regulated entities to identify and filter their
communications and deliveries by geography.
There are other laws besides the porn and spain statutes that implicate
the concerns of American Libraries Ass'n. Consider Consolidated Cigar
Co. v. Reilly.161 The district court read a Massachusetts cigar advertising
law not to apply to Internet advertising, reasoning that such regulation of
the Internet "would likely run into significant difficulty.., due to the
heavy burden it would place on interstate commerce." 162 The First Circuit
rejected the district court's narrower reading but agreed, with no analysis,
158. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 905 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
159. Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. v. Spitzer, No. 00 Civ. 7274, 2000 WL 1694307
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000).
160. See, e.g., Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).
161. 218 F.3d 30 (lst Cir. 2000).
162. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 84 F. Supp. 2d 180, 204 n.19 (D. Mass. 2000) (citing
Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 218 F.3d 30.
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that the regulation as applied to the Internet violated the dormant
Commerce Clause.
63
We do not know why the court reached this conclusion, but presumably
it did so because of the out-of-state burdens of the advertising regulation,
and especially because of the difficulty out-of-state Web advertisers would
have in keeping offending content out of Massachusetts. Understood this
way, the tobacco advertising regulation is like the porn and spain statutes
and unlike the wine, automobile, and cigarette regulations in the sense that
out-of-state persons face the special difficulties of identifying and
controlling the flow of digital information. The same is true for state
regulations of Web gambling, attorney advertising, marketing disclosure,
auctions, lotteries, and securities-all of which involve the delivery of
digital goods, all of which will become subjects of dormant Commerce
Clause challenge,"6 and all of which are subject to the analysis in this
Essay.
B. International Comparisons
The issues implicated by dormant Commerce Clause litigation also
arise in numerous contexts on the international stage. Consider a prominent
recent French decision involving the auction sites of the American company
Yahoo! Inc.' 65 Through servers located in the United States, Yahoo! offered
Nazi paraphernalia for auction. The offer of these goods is legal in the
United States but illegal in France. Web users in France, however, can
access the U.S. site. Can France regulate the foreign website that produces
local effects deemed harmful in France?
The issues here are very similar to the domestic U.S. pornographic
communication statutes. Activity deemed legal in one jurisdiction (an
Internet auction of Nazi goods conducted via U.S. computers) has effects
deemed harmful in another (the offer and sale of Nazi paraphernalia in
France). If France does nothing, its regulatory interests are undermined. If
France orders Yahoo! to remove the offending content, the regulations
might (if Yahoo! takes the items off its page) have the effect of limiting the
sale of Nazi items in places where they are legal, or they might (if Yahoo!
163. Consol. Cigar, 218 F.3d at 55-57.
164. See H. Joseph Hameline & William Miles, The Dormant Commerce Clause Meets the
Internet, 41 BOSTON B.J. 8, 8 (1997).
165. See Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisdmitisme v. Yahoo! Inc., T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20,
2000, available at www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis
2 0 0 0 l120.pdf (last visited Jan. 29,
2001). For English-language stories about the opinion, see John Tagliabue, French Uphold Ruling
Against Yahoo on Nazi Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at C8; and Kristi Essick, Yahoo Told To
Block Nazi Goods from French, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,20320,
00.html (Nov. 20,2000).
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passes along the costs of complying with the French regulation to auction
users) raise the cost of the Yahoo! service for persons outside France.
As we have suggested courts should do, the French court inquired into
the cost and effectiveness of geographical screening prior to its decision.
The court received a report from three Internet architecture experts that
concluded that such technology could at present filter out French users with
a ninety percent accuracy rate.' 66 Relying on this report, the French court
ordered Yahoo! to employ available geographical screening technology to
block French users from accessing the Nazi memorabilia on Yahoo!'s U.S.
website.'67 The court did not penalize Yahoo! for all Nazi content that
appeared in France, but only for content that Yahoo! could, through
reasonable efforts, keep out of France.
It is unlikely that either of the two potentially applicable international
law regimes places limits on the French court action. The first potential
restriction is customary international law limits on a nation's ability to
regulate extraterritorial events. Although the precise contours of this
constraint are unclear, customary international law generally allows a
nation to regulate foreign activity that has substantial and reasonably
foreseeable local effects. 68 These limits are akin to the limitations that the
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses impose on extraterritorial
state regulation. 69 France's regulation of unwanted Nazi information sent
from a Yahoo! server in the United States appears to satisfy this standard.
The second potential international regulation concerns the rules of
international trade as embodied in the treaties creating the World Trade
Organization (WTO). These rules, which are akin to our domestic dormant
Commerce Clause, allow France to regulate the offshore Nazi content.
Under WTO law, the primary constraint on the ability of member nations to
regulate imported goods is a nondiscrimination or "national treatment"
166. Yahoo!, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.juriscorn.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/
tgiparis20001120.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2001).
167. Id. at 2, 20.
168. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (applying U.S.
antitrust law when activity in England has a "substantial effect in the United States"); Case 89/85,
Ahlstroem v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (applying a similar "effects" test). See generally
Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: A Postscript on Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 213 (1993) (explaining the convergence of
European and American courts around the substantial-effects test for extraterritorial regulation).
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states that the effects test is a legitimate basis
for extraterritorial jurisdiction, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402 (1987), but adds that a state may not exercise such jurisdiction when it
would be "unreasonable" to do so, id. § 403. This reasonableness requirement has little basis in
state practice and does not reflect customary international law. William S. Dodge,
Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism,
39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 139-40 & nn.241-42 (1998).
169. See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1217-19.
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requirement. 7 In addition, there is a general exception to WTO obligations
for measures "necessary to protect public morals,"171 with the word
"necessary" understood to impose a least-restrictive-means requirement.'72
Notably absent from WTO law is any authority for a dispute resolution
panel to engage in open-ended balancing of the burdens on international
commerce against the benefits of regulation. The judgment that any such
balancing ought to be left to the political process of negotiation among
member states perhaps tells us something about the wisdom of such
balancing in domestic courts.
V. CONCLUSION
We have provided a general theoretical framework for analyzing
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state Internet regulations. Five
points bear emphasis. First, the out-of-state costs of state regulation of
cross-border externalities are commonplace and often desirable from the
efficiency perspective that informs the meaning and scope of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Second, the appropriate question about these state
regulations is not whether they produce out-of-state costs, but rather
whether they are properly calibrated to redress local harms. Third, the real
concern underlying the extraterritoriality and inconsistent-regulations
prongs of dormant Commerce Clause analysis is not out-of-state effects and
nonuniformity per se, but rather whether the out-of-state burdens of a
regulation outweigh its local benefits. Fourth, courts applying the dormant
Commerce Clause to state Internet regulations have committed significant
errors in identifying and weighing the regulations' costs and benefits. Fifth,
as a general matter, the federal political branches may be better suited than
the federal courts to balance and redress the harms and benefits of state
Internet regulations.
To date, dormant Commerce Clause analysis of state Internet
regulations has been marred by the same general error that infects much
thinking about Internet regulation more broadly. The error is the belief that
the Internet is a unique phenomenon that requires suspension of the normal
principles that govern cross-border conduct. In the dormant Commerce
Clause context, as in other regulatory contexts, this assumption is false.
Insight about Internet regulation comes, at least in the first instance, from
170. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 1947, art. lII, 61 Stat. A- 11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 (incorporated into the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization),
reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 20-21 (3d ed. 1995).
171. GATT, supra note 170, art. XX(a).
172. See ALAN 0. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED
GOODS MARKETS 68 (1995).
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focusing not on how the Internet is different from other communications
systems, but rather on the many ways in which it is similar.
